With the passing of Mahathir Mohammad from Malaysia’s political scene, Malaysia enters a new political phase.  In this new phase a key role will be played by the new Prime Minister, Abdullah Badawi, who is already seen in his first year in office as moving away from Mahathir’s policies.  Perhaps he will depart further from his former boss in the next one or two years following the strong mandate he received from the electorate in the March 2004 elections.  There has been a great deal of discussion in Malaysia regarding limits on the prime minister’s terms.  Many believe that the prime minister should serve only for two terms.  It will be interesting to see if the idea of term limits will translate into law.  However, the real opinion that counts in Malaysian politics is that of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the dominant partner in the ruling coalition, the National Front (BN).  Regardless of the opinions of groups outside of UMNO, including its partners in BN, the outcome of any proposal on term limits will very much depend on Badawi’s own stand on the matter.  At the moment Badawi has not given any indication of his inclination.

 Islam and Politics

After Mahathir, Islam will continue to be an important part of Malaysia’s political life.  Political Islam will remain an influential force in the country.  I define political Islam as that aspect of Islam that has to do with political ideas, values, practices, and culture including institutions.  Political Islam may be either directly connected to the religion of Islam or to Muslim political history.  In trying to predict the future of political Islam in Malaysia, it is important to rely on empirical facts pertaining to Malaysian politics.  However, there are empirical political facts that are transient and refer to just passing phenomena, and there are political facts that are more enduring in nature that may help us to foretell better a state’s political future; it is the second category that I will discuss.

The first political fact to be emphasized here is that political Islam in Malaysia is not a fringe or peripheral political force.  Rather it has been part of mainstream Malay-Muslim politics for a long time, even during the British colonial period.  Furthermore, Malay political Islam has been dynamic, able to adapt to changing situations by taking on new forms, and “pluralistic and democratic.”  The question then, is not whether political Islam will emerge as a central force – since it is already – but rather what shape will it take and how will it change in the coming years?  How will the various domestic and international factors influence the shaping of political Islam in the context of Malaysian politics?  For example, political Islam as pursued by Mahathir was certainly different from that accommodated by the three prime ministers before him (Tunku Abdul Rahman, Tun Abdul Razak, and Tun Hussein Onn).  Under Badawi, we can expect the character and form of political Islam being pursued to change again.  Indeed, the first few signs of change are already visible as will be discussed later.

Why has political Islam always been a central force?  The reasons are both historical and demographic.  Malay Muslims form the majority of the country’s population and thus the backbone of Malaysian politics.  As the latest national census shows, demographic trends point to a bigger Muslim percentage of the population, growing from 55 percent to nearly 60 percent.  The Muslim percentage is expected to increase in the coming decade.  Reacting to this demographic development, a Singaporean newspaper expressed in an editorial the concern that with the growing Muslim population, support for the opposition Islamic Party (PAS) and its goal to turn Malaysian into an Islamic state is likely to increase.  The opposition Chinese-dominated Democratic Action Party (DAP) has reacted to the swelling Muslim majority with similar sentiment.  But such reactions appear to have been hasty.  In the March 2004 general elections the majority of first-time young Malay voters rejected PAS in favor of UMNO.  One clear message from the election results is this:  a significant increase in the numerical superiority of Malay-Muslims in the ballot box does not necessarily translate into support for PAS’ vision of Islamic state.

Historically, for centuries the indigenous Malays have been Muslims and with independence they wielded political power.  Post-independence governments have been Malay dominated until now, an important factor to be noted.  In light of this fact, it is important to ask if change is possible in the ethnic makeup of the government in the next 10 years.  Is it possible that instead of the government continuing to be Malay dominated, members of other ethnic groups could secure the highest political positions in the country, either as prime minister or deputy prime minister?  I believe that as long as UMNO remains in power, it will not allow that to happen.

The Malay political domination will continue for a considerable period of time, but political realignments among the ethnic-based political parties may occur, especially if PAS succeeds in capturing more states.  In other words, what will happen is not so much that the political force of Islam will lose its centrality, but rather that the shape of Islamic politics and the rules of the political game will undergo changes.

The second political fact to be noted is that political Islam in Malaysia has been shaped mainly by the culture of Malay Islam as opposed to other cultural forces.  The two major characteristics that define Malay Islam are “Malayness” and a particular interpretation of Islam based on Sunni theology and the Shafi’i legal school of thought.  For many Malays, race prevails over religion.  Still, Islam is looked upon as a very important component of Malay identity since it defines and strengthens that identity.  The Malay sense of belonging to a community is very nurtured by their attachment to Islam.  But the strong Malay ethnic consciousness also means that the Malays can be quite selective in their understanding and appreciation of Islam, thus preferring Islamic expressions that conform to the Malay psyche.  Despite the emergence of numerous civil rights groups and NGOs that argue for a universal rather than an ethnic approach to Islam and a multiracial Malaysian politics, the dominant Malay mindset continues to favor a politics based on the marriage between ethnic nationalism and religion (Islam).  This party explains Badawi’s appeal to many Malays.  In traditional Malay eyes he is seen as a pious and devout Muslim yet also regarded as a Malay nationalist loyal to Malay interest.  He is surrounded by advisers who strongly believe in Malay nationalism and a moderate brand of Islam, factors that helped him to become Prime Minister and win a resounding victory in the recent general elections at the expense of PAS political Islam.

Regarding the Malay vision of Islam the following needs to be kept in mind:  Islam came to the Malay world in the thirteenth century as a result of Middle Eastern influence.  It should be noted, however, that thirteenth-century Middle East Islam was far more enlightened than it is today.  Islam has been ingrained as part of the Malay identity for a long time.  But as Malays began to feel threatened by Western colonialism and large-scale migration to Malaya of ethnic Chinese and Indians professing different religions, they began to distinguish themselves from the new colonizing and immigrant communities by presenting Islam as a Malay religion.  “Malayness” and Islamic sentiments became intertwined to an ever greater degree. This was the background to the modern political definition of Malay as “a Muslim who practices Malay customs” as enshrined in the Malaysian constitution.  Every now and then this constitutional clause has come under criticism from several quarters in the country.  The criticism came from both non-Muslims who are interested in converting the Malays to their respective religion and those including Muslims who want to present Islam in non-ethnic terms.  In contrast, since independence the constitutional definition of Malay has served as one of the important pillars of UMNO’s political Islam.

In theological terms, Malay Muslims are Ash’arite Sunnis, and they follow the Shafi’i legal school.  Thus, Malay Islam in a sense is quite homogenous, with very little pluralism within the religion itself. The Malaysian Department of Religious Affairs has been quite strict in protecting this “theological homogeneity.”  Under the country’s religious law, for example, Shi’ite Islam cannot be propagated in Malaysia, despite the fact that a small Shi’a community lives there.  Outside of Islam, however, Malay Muslims are quite open regarding issues of pluralism and dialogue with other religious groups.  It is the long historical Malay attachment to Ash’arite theology and Shafi’i fiqh (jurisprudence) that underlies Malay religious conservatism and provides the religious component of the Malay identity.

Badawi appears to have given some hints about his own religious inclination.  Shortly after Mahathir stepped down, Badawi was asked in an interview about influences on his religious thought and life.  Interestingly, he named al-Ghazzali (d. 1111) and al-Shafi’i (d. 820) as two Muslim religious scholars of the past who have inspired and influenced him most in his understanding and practice of Islam.  Since these two scholars also happen to be the most respected by the Malay-Muslim community, Badawi was probably sending a message to the community that he is a defender of traditional Malay Islam and true ulama.  In order to appreciate this particular stance of Badawi toward Islam, we need only to remind ourselves of the fact that Mahathir alienated a large segment of the Malay-Muslim community because of his frequent criticism of the ulama, both past and present.  But Badawi was also directing his message to PAS, which under the influence of the Iranian Islamic revolution has been championing the political rule of the ulama, albeit in a Sunni context. By identifying himself with al-Ghazzali and al-Shafi’i, Badawi is telling the Malays these are the true ulama they should revere, not those of the kind of “propagandists of political Islam” whom PAS holds dearly.

If Badawi’s long-term strategic goal on Islam is indeed to deemphasize fundamentalist and modernist political Islam among the Malays in favor of a more traditionalist political Islam, then we should watch out for his choice of religious advisers and his core supporters.  We certainly need to look closely at the kind of Islamic minds he has incorporated into his newly appointed cabinet.  In the March 2004 general elections many of his pro-Islam supporters were countering that PAS Islamic state agenda with an emphasis on “civilizational” or “cultural” Islam (Islam hadari). It is not yet clear to what extent Badawi’s “cultural Islam” project has contributed to his success in recovering the Malay support lost to the opposition in the last elections.  There is, however, the general perception that his moderate religious views have proved to be appealing to ordinary Malays as the recent election results have shown.  The extensive play of religious symbols by the government controlled media, such as television coverage of Badawi leading congregational prayers, appeared to have an impact on the Malay perception of his leadership, a fact that even PAS seems ready to acknowledge.  PAS may have badly lost the recent election, but there are plenty of reasons to believe that UMNO and PAS will continue to be locked in a political battle in which both sides appeal to religion to gain public support.

But there is another dimension of Badawi’s vision of Islam.  While wooing the traditional Malay ulama opposed to the PAS brand of political Islam, he is also affirming his commitment to a “modern and progressive Islam.”  In asserting this kind of Islam he has the support of intellectual activists like Chandra Muzaffar and the small but influential group of Muslim women human rights activists, the Sisters in Islam. It remains to be seen how these two faces of Badawi’s Islam – the cultural Islam supported by the traditionalists and the modern and progressive Islam supported by the modernists – find reconciliation under his leadership.

Malay Political Islam:  Stability and Change

Malay Islam manifests itself in politics mainly in the form of two political parties:  UMNO and PAS. This has been the case since 1957.  Structurally, this implies that political Islam in Malaysia has reached a certain level of maturity and stability.  Within the Malay political universe, since 1957, Malays have known only a two-party system, and I do not foresee that this will change in the near future.  Of course, over the last 47 years these two parties have produced offshoots, but these have been marginal parties that have not survived.  Good examples are BERJASA, a breakaway from PAS, and Semangat 46, a breakaway from UMNO.  A new political party that may yet break the post-independence Malay political tradition is Keadilan (Justice Party), which came into existence following Anwar Ibrahim’s imprisonment by Mahathir in 1998.  Led by Anwar’s wife, Dr. Wan Azizah, Keadilan is basically a political party of his former supporters in UMNO dedicated to keeping alive his political struggle and freeing him from prison. (Anwar was freed on September 2, 2004 after being acquitted of sodomy charge by the Federal Court).  With the party almost wiped out in the recent elections save for Wan Azizah’s parliamentary seat – after many of its members returned to the fold of UMNO – there are many who say that this party will not survive.  But there are those who are of the view that it is premature to write off  Keadilan.  They have a point.  Although the party is Malay dominated,

it is multiracial.  The multiracial image of the party has grown bigger, not smaller, especially after merging with the People’s Party to become a new identity, the Parti Keadilan Rakyat (People’s Justice Party).  But then unlike UMNO and PAS, Keadilan is no longer a purely Malay political party.

The fact remains that for the great majority of Malays, their political choice continues to be limited to either UMNO or PAS.  Most of the time, the majority of the Malays have given their support to UMNO.  But when they have deep reasons to be disillusioned with UMNO’s leadership they tend to flock to PAS.  This was the case in the 1969 elections when Malays were disillusioned with Tunku Abdul Rahman’s leadership and with Mahathir in the 1999 elections over the sacking of the popular Anwar as deputy prime minister and his expulsion from UMNO.  Badawi’s resounding victory in the recent elections shows that the majority of Malays have gone back to UMNO to give him a strong mandate to chart a new course for Malaysia, especially for Islam.  It looks like the decades-old structure of Malay political Islam is not going to see any major change in the coming decade.

The election results also mean we cannot expect to see any new realignment of non-Malay political forces that would impact Malay political Islam in

any significant way.  As it is now, apart from the opposition’s allegations of a grossly unfair election, the only significant development to watch is the proposal by the Chinese-dominated Democratic Action Party (DAP), which has emerged as the biggest opposition group in parliament with 12 seats, for a merger with Keadilan.  One of the grounds for merger cited by the DAP leader, Lim Kit Siang, is the need to stem the tide of political Islam and reaffirm Malaysia’s secular democracy.  Strong opposition from within both parties has forced the merger proposal to be quickly abandoned.

Outside the domain of the political parties, however, there are NGOs and cultural groups that may have a significant degree of influence in shaping Malaysian politics in general and political Islam in particular.  Both UMNO and PAS are well aware of the fact that each of them needs the support of such groups to strengthen its political power.  Both parties know that they cannot be and remain in power without the cooperation of non-Muslim or non-Malay political parties and the support of the non-Muslim communities.  More than UMNO, PAS is now under strong pressure to build new bridges to the non-Muslim communities.

PAS and the Rule of the Cleric

The historical developments of UMNO and PAS have shown that outside influences have often led to major changes within the respective parties.  For example, PAS, which since its inception has been professing a political Islam that is wed to ethnic nationalism, was deeply influenced by the Iranian revolution.  It began to embrace the idea of the rule of the ulama.  For nearly two decades it was able to put the idea into practice because it had leaders acceptable to members from among the ulama.  But following the death of its President, Fadzil Nor, in 2002, PAS faced a leadership crisis.  In the 2003 party elections, while Hadi Awang, an ulama, was unanimously elected president to succeed Fadzil, PAS faced difficulty in finding someone from the rank of the ulama widely acceptable to become the number two leader.  For the deputy leader’s position, the party found itself in a dilemma whether to choose a popular and able candidate who comes from a secular background and therefore go against the party principle of the rule of the cleric, or to stand by the principle and settle for a candidate from the ulama but with “lesser leadership” qualities.  Although the victory went to the ulama, the party election results have revealed deep divisions within the party on the issue of the ulama leadership that throw doubt on the survival of the principle.  PAS’s poor showing in the recent elections is likely to place the idea of ulama leadership under closer scrutiny by members not from the religious stream of education.

The Future of Malaysian

Political Islam:  2004 Elections and Beyond

Badawi’s triumph at the polls has led some political commentators to predict prematurely the demise of political Islam in Malaysia and the decline of PAS as an Islamic political party.  PAS’s brand of political Islam may  have fared worse in the 2004 than in the 1999 elections in terms of total electoral seats won, but the party has managed to increase its share of popular votes compared to 1999 when it was already regarded as having performed relatively well.  PAS remains a formidable challenge to UMNO.  This means UMNO has to energize its own brand of political Islam and the Islamic state to continue in the coming decade.  Critics of UMNO’s victory have made the observation that considering the various factors that have favored the ruling party, PAS has not really lost support among the Malays.  One of these factors was the redrawing of parliamentary and state constituencies that PAS in particular had criticized before the elections as deliberately intended to minimize its chance of retaining the seats it has held.  The redrawing of constituency boundaries saw the creation of new safe seats for UMNO and the incorporation of non-Muslim voters into PAS strongholds that made it difficult for the opposition party to defend its seats.

PAS and the rest of the opposition have directed their wrath at the Election Commission for what they perceive as its bias toward the ruling party, not only in the redrawing of constituencies exercise but also in its conduct of the election.  As a matter of fact, PAS and Keadilan have refused to endorse the election results for the whole country after alleging widespread irregularities and foul play in the election process.  They have submitted a memorandum to the king asking for the formation of an independent royal commission of inquiry to probe the allegations. While the DAP has demanded a fresh election for the state of Selangor, PAS and Keadilan have demanded it for the entire country.  As expected, Badawi has rejected the opposition demand for an independent inquiry.  This new political development arising from recent elections means that we can expect the opposition to be putting more attention on the issue of the Malaysian democratic process, especially the issue of the independence of the Election Commission.

If the 1999 swing of voters to the Malay opposition and the 2004 swing back to UMNO signal the emergence of a new attitudinal pattern among independent and first time voters, then in the coming decade we may see a greater fluidity in party preferences that will make Malaysian elections less predictable.  What this means is that certain assumptions that have held true in the past may not hold true in the coming decade.  Badawi cannot take for granted that his big victory points to the rejection of the Islamic state by the Malays and therefore he can ignore the issue.  What Badawi can and will probably do is focus on ideological change away from PAS’s vision of Islamic state.

Badawi’s vision of Islam has yet to be made clear.  His “modern and progressive Islam” and his “Islam hadari” may have been presented to the electorate as appealing alternative slogans to PAS’s model of Islamic state, but in the long run people are interested in understanding his real vision on political Islam.  Certainly he has to take a clearer stand on the issue of Islamic state, whether he wants to present another version of an Islamic state as Mahathir has done or he wants to dissociate himself completely from the idea.  With a strong mandate, is Badawi ready for an ideological offensive on PAS’s vision of an Islamic state?  He needs to articulate the two faces of his Islam that would clearly distinguish it from PAS’s vision of Islam. Until now UMNO has been on the defensive on the Islamic state issue.  UMNO must make an offensive argument and define its own borders.  If it wants to defend Mahathir’s proclamation of Malaysia as an Islamic state and accept is consequences for the country’s pluralistic society and democratic framework, then it must unveil its brand of Islamic state.  Likewise, if it decides to abandon the idea of an Islamic state altogether, then it needs to confront PAS’s Islamic state with a clear alternative that addresses the sensitivities of both the Muslim and non-Muslim communities.  Without doubt, many Malaysians will be eager to know how Badawi’s vision of  Islam is going to manifest itself, particularly in the country’s political life.

Another development to watch in the area of political discourse on Islam in Malaysia is the kind of non-Muslim responses to political Islam that will emerge.  There is a feeling that the Chinese community has voted back into parliament well-known opposition figures like Lim Kit Siang and Karpal Singh because they want them to help check the tide of political Islam in the country.  The two political veterans are well known for their rejection of the Islamic state, either of the PAS or UMNO type.  Most Malays do not like to see non-Malays who are not Muslims talking about their religion.  But the two opposition politicians have shown they are ever ready to discourse on Islam whenever they feel that initiatives on Islam – whether coming from UMNO or PAS – are going to affect the lives of non-Muslims.

Will Badawi allow or even encourage a freer public discourse on Islam in which non-Muslims can participate, at least on matters affecting them?  We do not know.  We do know some major traits of his leadership that distinguish him from Mahathir.  But perhaps more of his leadership style and substance unknown to Malaysians will become visible in the next five years of his administration.  In comparing himself to his predecessor, Badawi has admitted and indeed shown that his style of leadership will be different.  As expected, he has also given clear indications that he would be focusing more on human development and domestic issues like agriculture rather than on playing a more visible role in international politics.  A major criticism of Mahathir is that, though he was rather successful in modernizing Malaysia’s economy, he neglected human development issues, including issues of human rights, intellectual freedom, and liberty.

Big Promises and

Big Challenges

Badawi has made a number of big promises:  to root out corruption, to promote a democratic culture, to reemphasize and modernize agriculture, to overcome ethnic polarization, and above all to implement ‘Islam hadari.’  It was largely those promises and the little steps he had taken in the direction of delivering them that had helped him to win big in the March 2004 elections.  But in many areas that he has promised changes his Administration’s post-elections drive appears to have slowed down.  Clearly on is sues of corruption and democracy in particular the opposition political parties as well as various independent groups are not yet impressed with his performance despite some encouraging signs.  Many cannot help wondering if he is really in a position to deliver on his promises, even just some of them.  The September 2004 UMNO party elections have only raised more questions about Badawi’s ability to do just that.  He has suffered a major setback when his “team” failed to wrest control of the party’s highest decision-making body, the Supreme Council.

As the popular saying goes, in Malaysian politics UMNO’s party elections are always more important than the national elections. The party is split into many factions each centered round a personality, and the internal split is severe.  It is true Badawi had been confirmed unopposed as the party’s President, but neither his big win in the national polls, nor his easy confirmation as the party leader reflects his real strength in the party.  It now appears factions loyal to Badawi’s deputy, Najib Tun Abdul Razak, have emerged as the strongest, posing a big challenge to Badawi’s leadership.  It is also well-known Najib has the strong backing of Mahathir.  Several Mahathir loyalists made a surprising comeback to the Supreme Council leading to some to claim Mahathir had a hand in Badawi’s defeat.  There are good reasons to support the claim.  Mahathir is getting increasingly uneasy with Badawi.  The latter has suspended indefinitely Mahathir’s planned mega-projects.  He has taken action against allegedly corrupt individuals including a prominent businessman with close link to Mahathir.  Such high-profile cases tend to confirm the popular belief that Mahathir has tolerated corruption.  Most displeasing to Mahathir is Anwar’s acquittal of sodomy charge and the public’s excitement over his possible return to active politics in UMNO.  Mahathir has more than once reacted to Anwar’s freedom by saying he still believes his former deputy is guilty of sodomy and therefore morally unfit for public office.  Anwar’s release “loosened a torrent of speculation” including of a secret deal between him and

Badawi.  Although Anwar and Badawi both denied having any deal anxiety heightened within UMNO over Anwar’s readmission into the party.  There was a backlash against Badawi from factions opposed to Anwar.  One could say that one important consequence of Anwar’s release is the realignment of Malay  politics in general and of UMNO factions in particular.  Surprising as it may be, it is now possible to speak of a “Najib-Mahathir alliance” that is in a fierce competition with a “Badawi-Anwar alliance” even when Mahathir no longer holds any party post and Anwar not even a party member.

Obviously Badawi does not want to be known as a one-term UMNO President and one-term Malaysian Prime Minister.  The biggest threat to his leadership comes from within the party itself.  If he fails to appease the different factions within his party, which is a difficult thing he could well be challenged in the next party elections.  The source of that challenge is likely to be the “Najib-Mahathir alliance.”  In view of the impending threat to his leadership from within UMNO and the ideological challenge to his “Islam hadari” from PAS Badawi clearly needs allies.  In this he could not find a better ally than Anwar.  Anwar still has a considerable following among UMNO members.  As far as “Islam hadari” is concerned it is very much compatible with Anwar’s own vision of Islam.  Anwar could provide the much needed intellectual content for theconept that is now lacking.  But the two former political rivals are now eye to eye on most issues that are high on Badawi’s agenda in the first-term of his administration.  If Badawi and Anwar decide to join forces in the war against graft then there is every chance of a significant progress in the war.  But there is bund to be a backlash against both of them.

Anwar is an important factor in the evolution of Malaysian Islam in the coming years.  With or without collaboration with Badawi he is set to exert a considerable influence on the development of political Islam in the country.  Certainly, Anwar has the credentials to play the role of a moderating influence on the Malay-Muslim community that would help check the growth of religious radicalism and extremism.  As a champion of inter-cultural dialogue he is also seen as someone who is in a position to help build bridges between Malaysia’s diverse ethnic groups and religious communities.  But a “Badawi-Anwar alliance” promises a better and more interesting future for Malaysia.▼

- Dr. Osman Bakar
is Malaysia Chair of Islam in
Southeast Asia

SAHIYFAH ONLINE